We investigate whether audit committee members of the board prove to be better monitors if they are also on the compensation committee, as they would be more attuned to compensation related earnings management incentives. Analyzing data on a sample of S&P 500 firms over the period 2003-2005, we find that ceteris paribus, firms with overlapping audit and compensation committees have higher financial reporting quality, proxied for by discretionary accruals than those without such overlap. Further, we find that there is an inverted U shaped relationship between overlapping magnitude and financial reporting quality, with an optimum overlap of about 47%. Our findings are robust to controlling for the percentage of CEOs' incentive compensation and using accounting restatements as another proxy for financial reporting quality. Overall, our results suggest that there is knowledge spillover from the compensation committee to the audit committee, as reflected in higher financial reporting quality. We interpret this to suggest that some overlapping of the committee memberships may be beneficial to audit committee monitoring effectiveness.
Introduction
Recent accounting irregularities in high profile public companies have been attributed to earnings management practices by corporate managers. These practices have raised concerns about the quality of public companies' reported earnings 1 and garnered increasing attention by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). At the same time, the role of audit committees in ensuring the quality of financial reporting has come under considerable scrutiny. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in particular represents the most sweeping reform of US securities laws relating to corporate governance, disclosures, and reporting requirements since the 1930s. For instance, SOX requires that the audit committee be fully independent and financially literate. The role of audit committees in monitoring a firm's financial reporting quality is recognized as a central concern in the smooth functioning of capital markets, and is a primary focus of corporate governance reform in the post-SOX era.
Audit committee members need information about their company's business activities and economic contexts in order to perform their monitoring functions
effectively. An important source of this information to audit committees is senior management, who possess information that is crucial to the valuation of their firm.
However, management incentives in making representations, disclosures and accounting choices are likely driven by the structure of their compensation contracts Zimmerman, 1986, 1990) . If audit committee members are more attuned to the incentives provided by management compensation, they are more likely to incorporate 1 In an influential speech in September 1998, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt raised concerns about firms' earnings management practices. Following this speech, the SEC staff issued three staff accounting bulletins (SABs) intended to improve financial reporting transparency. These SABs describe several earnings management techniques used by managers and point to the undesirable consequences of earnings decreasing as well as earnings increasing manipulations.
them into their monitoring of the firm's financial reporting process. Membership on the board's compensation committee is likely to provide directors with intimate knowledge of senior management's compensation-related incentives. We therefore investigate whether membership on both compensation and audit committees is beneficial to audit committee members in performing their financial reporting oversight function. We predict that such overlapping membership is likely to result in higher financial reporting quality due to this knowledge spillover effect.
The corporate governance consequence of overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees has been a contentious issue, particularly in the post-SOX period. In a special comment entitled "Best Practices in Audit Committee Oversight of Internal Audit," Moody's Investors Service (2006) argues in favor of audit committee members serving on the compensation committee, the rationale being that "…the audit committee should have a thorough understanding of executive incentives and goals so that it is aware of management's motivations." (p. 8, Moody's Investors Service 2006).
In contrast, the Higgs Report (2003) considers it undesirable for any one individual to be placed simultaneously on the audit, remuneration and nomination committees "in order not to concentrate too much influence on one individual" (p. 59, Higgs 2003) . Given the significant role of audit committees in monitoring financial reporting quality and the increasing concerns about the effect of compensation arrangements on earnings management, there are potentially positive monitoring outcomes that can arise with overlapping membership on the two committees. This study provides evidence on this issue as it considers the corporate governance consequence of the micro structure of the board that is yet to be studied in accounting research.
The corporate governance implications of board characteristics as well as auditee characteristics have been investigated in prior accounting research (e.g., Klein 2002a).
However, little empirical research has been conducted to date on board structure and monitoring effectiveness in general and the consequences of delegating board functions to committees in particular. Understanding the costs and benefits of the board committee structure is particularly important as boards typically operate through the use of committees. We contribute to this area by considering the effect of overlapping memberships on two of the most active and important board committees -the compensation and audit committees -on the monitoring effectiveness of the audit committee.
Additionally, prior literature on audit committees has been conducted almost exclusively in the pre-SOX era. Due to the widespread regulatory changes as a result of SOX as well as the likely adjustments made by capital market participants in response to the changed environment, we choose to study audit committee effectiveness in the post-SOX period. Thus, our study contributes to recent, post-SOX debates on board structure and composition in practice as well.
Following prior research on audit committee effectiveness like Klein (2002a), we choose non-financial S&P 500 companies as the starting point for our sample. As SOX possibly reflects a major inflection point with respect to corporate governance and disclosure, we examine the post-SOX sample period [2003] [2004] [2005] . Our analysis proceeds in the following stages. First, we investigate whether firms that have overlapping audit and compensation committee members have higher financial reporting quality compared to firms in which there is no overlap of membership between these two committees.
Second, we examine whether the magnitude of this overlap is related to financial reporting quality; in other words, if there is a benefit to overlapping membership, is this a monotonically increasing effect?
We document several interesting findings. First, we find that after controlling for other commonly used determinants of financial reporting quality, firms with overlapping audit and compensation committees have higher financial reporting quality than those without such overlap. However, we do not find that this association is monotonic; rather, we find that there is an inverted U shaped relationship between the magnitude 2 of the overlap and financial reporting quality. This suggests that overlapping membership is beneficial to an extent; beyond a certain point, however, the benefits of committee overlap decline. Our findings have implications for policy deliberations on the composition of board committees in general and audit committees in particular, as it clarifies the benefits of overlapping committee members.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and formulates the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design including sample selection and estimation models. Section 4 presents empirical results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature and Hypotheses Development
Corporate boards assume an oversight role in mitigating agency problems resulting from the separation of corporate ownership and managerial control (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983) . This oversight role involves appointing the 2 The magnitude of overlap is defined as the proportion of audit committee members that is also on the compensation committee.
CEO, setting incentive compensation for top management, approving and reviewing business strategies, monitoring control systems, liaising with external auditors, etc.
Given its diverse responsibilities, the board of directors typically delegates its oversight activities to different sub-committees. The audit committee is one of the most important sub-committees and its main responsibility is to oversee financial reporting. Another key board committee is the compensation committee, which has responsibility for determining appropriate compensation packages for top management and assessing executives' performance.
The finance literature has documented the link between compensation structure and financial performance, and the accounting literature has demonstrated that corporate governance and compensation structures have a substantial impact on earnings management. However, the link between the compensation committee's oversight on compensation contracts and performance and the audit committee's oversight of financial reporting quality is as yet unexplored. Below we review the literature on these separate literature strands that we integrate in this paper.
Literature review
Accounting research has long examined the effectiveness of audit committees in monitoring the quality of firms' financial reporting. Early research investigates whether the existence of an audit committee improves a firms' financial reporting quality. The general finding is that there is a positive association between the presence of an audit committee and the firm's financial reporting quality. For example, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) document that overstatement errors in annual earnings are less likely among firms that have an audit committee. Wild (1996) While prior accounting research has focused on attributes like audit committee independence and found a positive association with a firm's earnings quality, the post-SOX environment calls for an investigation of other attributes of audit committees that potentially determine their effectiveness. This is because, in the post-SOX era, as audit committees are required to be fully independent (Section 301, SOX), audit committee independence is not likely to be associated with a firm's financial reporting quality, because of lack of variability in the attribute.
Given the complexities of financial reporting particularly for public companies, at least a subset of audit committees should have financial reporting expertise (BRC 1999).
Consistent with this notion, Xie et al. (2003) document that an audit committee member with financial expertise enhances committee performance. In addition, DeFond et al.
(2005) provide evidence that it is specific accounting expertise rather than the broadly defined "financial expertise" that improves the audit committee's effectiveness. Other dimensions of audit committees that have been found to be associated with financial reporting outcomes include audit committee size (DeZoort and Salterio 2001; Anderson et al. 2004 ) and number of meetings (Menon and Williams 1994; Beasley et al 2000) .
This stream of prior research has largely focused on incentives (e.g., independence) and information processing abilities (e.g., financial expertise and number of meetings) of the audit committee in performing monitoring activities. Audit committee independence and financial expertise are mainly related to how given information sets are processed; independence is a quality that results in unbiased information processing, while financial expertise is associated with more effective information processing. Since effective information processing depends on the availability of sufficient information and knowledge, the validity of the emphasis on audit committee independence and financial expertise depends on the accessibility of information by audit committee members (Nowak and McCabe 2003) . We argue that audit committee members who are also members of the compensation committee of the board have more direct knowledge of the managements' compensation related incentives in making accounting choices. They can therefore prove to be better monitors by neutralizing managements' propensity to make accounting choices that are driven by their incentives to maximize their compensation.
There is a long stream of literature that has examined the relation between executive compensation and earnings management. Theoretically, providing executives with incentive compensation, such as stock options should align managers' and shareholders' interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, both conventional wisdom and prior empirical results suggest that incentive compensation might provide managers incentives to manage earnings. 4 Accounting research has established that compensation related incentives are associated with opportunistic earnings management behavior.
Early research focused on accruals management incentives based on bonus plans (Healy 1985; Healy et al. 1987; Gaver et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995) . More recent research examines stock price based incentives, and the use of earnings management to affect managements' wealth. Sloan (1996) for instance finds that managers use aggressive earnings management to increase stock price at least in the short run. Beneish and Vargus (2002) Other recent studies have found a nondirectional relationship between stock based incentive compensation and earnings management. Burns and Kedia (2006) find that firms whose CEOs have significant options exposure are more likely to file earnings restatements. Similarly, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that the level of earnings management is positively related to managements' stock based incentives, particularly those provided by stock options.
We bring together these two separate streams of prior research by examining whether audit committee members' intimate knowledge of compensation related incentives to manage earnings will improve their ability to monitor the financial reporting process, thereby reducing earnings management.
Research hypotheses
Compensation plans are established to generate appropriate incentives to align the interests of management and shareholders. These incentives are frequently tied to accounting performance measures (Lambert 1993) . Since the compensation committee is responsible for establishing management's compensation plan, it is very likely that members of this committee would have a deep and nuanced understanding of the incentives that the plan generates. This would also imply that compensation committee members have a more thorough knowledge of management's incentives to manipulate earnings. Thus, if an audit committee member also serves on the firm's compensation committee, this member could use the knowledge about management's compensation-driven incentives to unravel opportunistic accounting choices that the management might make. Therefore, the overlap between compensation committee and audit committee might be beneficial in reducing the information asymmetry between audit committee and management, resulting in higher financial reporting quality induced by improved monitoring by the audit committee.
Furthermore, directors' liabilities have been increased substantially after SOX due to increased accountability of directors (Linck et al. 2008) . As a result, audit committee members who also sit on compensation committees likely have greater incentives to use knowledge and information obtained from serving on the compensation committee. This may accentuate the positive association between overlapping committees and financial reporting quality after SOX, which is the time period of our study.
As we have previously argued, overlapping membership with the compensation committee potentially results in knowledge spillover that is useful to the audit committee's financial reporting oversight function. However, there are costs related to the degree of overlap as well. As Laux and Laux (2007) argue, a potential advantage of delegating board functions to committees is that using smaller subgroups can reduce the free-rider problem that plagues larger groups. If there is a complete overlap committee, the subgroup structure and its advantages break down. Since setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting system are two major, but different functions of a board (Laux and Laux 2007) , membership in both the audit and compensation committees is very time consuming, exacerbating the free-rider problem with increased committee overlap. Further, high degree of committee overlap likely leads to the dilution of effort and diffusion of responsibility because of multi-accountability, which could mitigate the oversight function of the audit committee.
If such overlapping membership is expected to improve financial reporting quality, we further examine whether the magnitude of this overlap matters. Specifically, if overlapping membership is positively associated with financial reporting quality, is it true that the magnitude of overlap is monotonically associated with financial reporting quality?
In the limit, is the best outcome a 100% overlapping of audit and compensation committees?
We do not expect that there is such a monotonic relationship. Instead, we anticipate an inverted U-Shaped relationship between the magnitude of the overlap and financial reporting quality as there may be costs related to overlap that needs to trade-off against the benefits of having overlapping committee members. This trade-off is expected to result in an "optimum" degree of overlap.
Based on the above discussion, we specify the following hypotheses in alternate form: 
Empirical models
In our empirical models we use performance matched discretionary accruals (see and the modified Jones model. We examine whether our findings are robust to using accounting restatements as an alternate proxy of financial reporting quality.
Our primary independent variable of interest is OVERLAP which we measure in two ways -as a dummy specification and as a continuous variable. We provide below more precise definitions of these and other variables related to audit committee and firm characteristics.
To test our first hypothesis (H1), we specify the following estimation model: (Yermack 1996) . CEO_TENURE is measured as the number of years the current CEO has been in his or her position. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) observe that there are entrenchment effects associated with CEO tenure. CEO_HOLD is the proportion of common equity owned by the CEO.
MV/BV, measuring firm growth potential, is the ratio of market value to book value measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. NEG_NI is an indicator for firms having two or more consecutive years of negative income, ending on the fiscal year prior to the shareholders' meeting. ABS_ΔNI is the absolute value of the change in net income between previous year and current year deflated by last year's assets. Klein (2002a) 6 For simplicity, we suppress subscripts i and t. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables used in our study. A typical board has approximately 10 directors, 4 of whom, on average, sit on the audit committee. 7 Practically all of the boards and audit committees in our sample are independent, which is not surprising given the fact that we examine S&P 500 firms, which are required to have independent directors. The mean OVERLAP is 0.64, which means that almost two-thirds of the companies in our sample have at least one director who is on both the audit and compensation committees. The average OVERLAP_P is about 31%, indicating that about a third of the members of audit committees are also members of the compensation committee. The average CEO tenure is around 6 years and most of the CEOs have a very small percentage ownership (the upper quartile is 0.004) in the company. Regarding accounting variables, the average absolute abnormal accrual is 4% of previous years' total assets; the average market to book ratio is 3.71; around 15% of our observations have two or more years of consecutive losses; and the average long term debt is about 21% of the previous years' total assets.
Empirical Results

Descriptive statistics
[Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 presents spearman correlations between all sets of variables. The correlation between OVERLAP and the natural log of absolute value of abnormal accruals (ln(ABS_PMDA)) is negative but not statistically significant. Similarly, the magnitude of the overlap (OVERLAP_P) is insignificantly and negatively correlated with ln(ABS_PMDA) before controlling for other contextual variables. In addition, OVERLAP is negatively (p-value<0.01) correlated with BD_SIZE. Also, OVERLAP is negatively (p-value<0.01) correlated with BD_IND, which is probably due to the fact that both audit committee and compensation committee are now required to be 100% independent .
[Insert Table 4 about here] 7 The NYSE and the NASDAQ require that each company at least has three audit committee members.
Regression results
Since we have unbalanced panel data, we run fixed-effects regressions for all of our estimation models. Table 5 reports the fixed-effects regression results of relating financial reporting quality to the presence of overlapping committee members and other control variables.
Overlapping committees and financial reporting quality
The coefficient on OVERLAP is highly significant at conventional levels, providing strong support to our hypothesis H1. This suggests that firms with at least one audit committee member who also sits on the compensation committee have, on average, lower levels of discretionary accruals than firms without such overlap in the post-SOX period.
The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior literature.
For example, as in Klein (2002a), we also find that firm size is negatively associated with the discretionary accruals.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Overlapping magnitude and financial reporting quality
Given that our hypothesis H1 is confirmed, we evaluate H2 to examine whether the extent of overlap of membership between the audit and compensation committees matters. The results, presented in [Insert Table 6 about here]
Robustness checks
If knowledge of compensation related incentives in general makes audit committee members better monitors of the financial reporting outcomes of the firm, a concern might arise regarding whether the magnitude of CEOs' incentive compensation affects the association between overlapping committee membership and financial reporting quality. Prior research has shown that a greater level of incentive compensation provides management with higher incentives to manage earnings, resulting in a larger monitoring benefit from the transfer of incentive-related information to audit committee members. To address this concern, we introduce a new control variable, INCE, the proportion of CEOs' non salary compensation and its interaction term, OVERLAP*INCE into our estimation models. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7 .
After controlling for the proportion of CEOs' compensation-related incentives, we still find a significantly (p-value <0.05) negative relation between overlapping committees and the financial reporting quality. Also, we find that there is a significant (p-value <0.1) mediating effect of OVERLAP on the association between INCE and financial reporting quality. A joint test of the coefficients of OVERLAP and the interaction term, OVELAP*INCE, shows negative and significant (p-value <0.05) results, which indicates that, overall, there is a significantly positive relation between OVERLAP and financial reporting quality, even after controlling for the percentage of incentive compensation to CEOs.
To further evaluate the robustness of our empirical results, we repeat our tests of H1, and H2 using another proxy for financial reporting quality, namely, the incidence of accounting restatements (REST). 9 REST is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the current year's final statements need to be restated and zero otherwise. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 7 . Consistent with our prior results, we find a significantly (p-value <0.1) negative relation between OVERLAP and the incidence of accounting restatement. Also, as with our discretionary accrual measure of financial reporting quality, we find a U shape relationship between OVERLAP_P and the incidence of accounting restatement (p-value<0.05). These results indicate that our previous findings regarding the association between overlapping memberships, overlapping magnitude and financial reporting quality are robust to an alternate specification of financial reporting quality.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
There may be reasons to believe that overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees is affected by financial reporting quality. For example, it is possible that a firm with better financial reporting quality is more likely to structure boards with overlapping membership between the two committees. Thus, our analyses suffer from a potential endogeneity issue. We address this self-selection or reverse causality problem using the Heckman (1979) two step treatment effects model. 10 In the treatment effects model, we model OVERLAP as an endogenous choice. Note that the first-stage probit model includes the proxy for financial reporting quality (the absolute value of performance matched discretionary accruals) and all other control variables that also enter the second-stage (outcome) regression. Results (untabulated) of the secondstage regression show that the OVERLAP (treatment) coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level using absolute value of performance matched discretionary accruals as dependent variable. In brief, the Heckman model estimations support our main analysis, thereby providing robust evidence to suggest that on average, firms with overlapping memberships between the audit and compensation committees have higher financial reporting quality than firms without such overlapping membership.
Furthermore, our empirical results remain qualitatively unchanged even when we control for number of audit committee meetings. 
Conclusion
This study investigates whether overlapping membership on the audit and compensation committees is positively associated with financial reporting quality. In contrast to prior literature on audit committee effectiveness, our study focuses on the post-SOX era as a way to enhance our understanding of the monitoring role of audit committees in the new regulatory regime. Based on a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find that firms with such overlapping members are associated, on average, with higher financial reporting quality. In addition, we find that the magnitude of the overlap matters. The relationship between overlapping magnitude and financial reporting quality is non-linear and inverted U-shaped. This suggests that the benefits of overlapping membership decline after a certain point. Additional overlapping beyond that point appears to provide detrimental effects, as the costs of overlapping exceed the benefits.
Our results help clarify some of the on-going debate surrounding board structure and have important practical implications. Given the limited number of qualified board members available, the optimal allocation of individual board members to committees is important. The findings of this study provide some guidance in implementing this task.
For instance, for a firm with four (the average audit committee size in our sample is 3.99) audit committee members, assigning two 12 audit committee members to the compensation committee seems to be the optimal choice. By using the first order condition (FOC) of the function [-0.7871*OVERLAP_P+0.8385*OVERLAP_P 2 ], we find that the optimal OVERLAP_P is 0.4694. That is, on average, holding everything else constant, when the overlapping percentage is 47% in the post-SOX period, the abnormal accruals are the lowest. REST is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if current year's final statements need to be restated and zero otherwise. See table 2 for other variable definitions. P-values are based on one tailed (two tailed) tests for variables whose relation to the dependent variables is (is not) predicted.
